Langkilde 2.0

Detta är ett inlägg i kategorin “I don’t know when, I don’t know how, but something bad is going to happen!”. Viss reservation även för att detta är ett väldigt komplicerat ämne, och att jag kan ha missförstått delar av problemet.

En fråga som intresserar många ekonomer just nu är hur värdet av den kinesiska valutan renminbi i framtiden kommer utvecklas relativt dollarn. Det är en extremt komplicerad fråga av stort intresse. En härlig blandning av militär makt, ekonomisk konkurrenskraft och helt vanlig politisk makt ligger bakom. Följande står att läsa på Wikipedia (ett utmärkt ställe att påbörja sitt kunskapssökande):

Value

For most of its early history, the RMB was pegged to the U.S. dollar at 2.46 yuan per USD (note: during the 1970s, it was appreciated until it reached 1.50 yuan per USD in 1980). When China’s economy gradually opened in the 1980s, the RMB was devalued in order to improve the competitiveness of Chinese exports. Thus, the official RMB/USD exchange rate declined from 1.50 yuan in 1980 to 8.62 yuan by 1994 (lowest ever on the record). Improving current account balance during the latter half of the 1990s enabled the Chinese government to maintain a peg of 8.27 yuan per USD from 1997 to 2005.

Fixed exchange to US Dollar removed

On 21 July 2005, the peg was finally lifted, which saw an immediate one-off RMB revaluation to 8.11 per USD.^[23] The exchange rate against the euro stood at 10.07060 yuan per euro.

Managed Float

The RMB is now moved to a managed floating exchange rate based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of foreign currencies. The daily trading price of the U.S. dollar against the RMB in the inter-bank foreign exchange market would be allowed to float within a narrow band of 0.3% around the central parity published by the People’s Bank of China (PBC); in a later announcement published on 18 May 2007, the band was extended to 0.5%.^[24] The PRC has stated that the basket is dominated by the United States dollar, euro, Japanese yenand South Korean won, with a smaller proportion made up of the British pound, Thai baht, Russian ruble, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar and Singapore dollar.^[25]

On April 10, 2008, it traded at 6.9920 yuan per U.S. dollar, which is the first time in more than a decade that a dollar bought less than seven yuan,^[26] and at 11.03630 yuan per euro.

As of January 2010 Chinese and non-Chinese citizens have an annual quota to change a maximum of 50,000 USD. Exchange will only proceed if the applicant appears in person at the relevant bank, presents his passport resp. his Chinese ID as these deals are being centrally registered. The maximal withdrawal is 10,000 USD per day, the maximal purchase quota of USD is 500 per day. This stringent management of the currency leads to a bottled-up demand for exchange in both directions. It is viewed as a major tool to keep the currency peg i.e. to prevent inflows of ‘hot money’ (carry trade).

Purchasing power parity

Scholarly studies suggest that the yuan is undervalued on the basis of purchasing power parity analysis

• The International Monetary Fund estimated that, by purchasing power parity, one United States dollar was equivalent to approximately RMB3.462 in 2006, RMB3.621 in 2007, and RMB3.798 in 2008.^[29]

En kort sammanfattning; Kina ser till att hålla växelkursen RMB/USD artificiellt låg, vilket gör att kinesiska exportvaror blir extra billiga. Det finns en uppfattning om att detta är farligt för USA, och att Kinas massiva valutareserv (primärt baserad på amerikanska statsskuldsväxlar) utgör en möjlighet för Kina att pressa USA i politiska frågor.

Simon Johnson, på The Baseline Scenario och tidigare chefsekonom på IMF, skrev häromdagen ett inlägg där han försökte reda ut riskerna med att Kina försvarar sin valuta på det vis de gör.

China is the largest holder of official foreign currency reserves in the world, currently estimated to be worth around $2.4 trillion – an increase of nearly $500 billion in the course of 2009 (on the back of a current account surplus of just under $300 billion, i.e., 5.8 percent of China’s GDP, and a capital account surplus of around $100 billion).  These reserves are accumulated through arguably the largest ever sustained intervention in a foreign exchange market – i.e., through The People’s Bank of China buying dollars and selling renminbi, and thus keeping the renminbi-dollar exchange rate more depreciated than it would be otherwise.

…There is a perception that China’s large dollar holdings confer upon that country some economic or political power vis-à-vis the United States and, in particular, that Chinese reserves prevent us from putting pressure on that country’s authorities to revalue (i.e., appreciate) the renminbi.  This view is incorrect and completely misunderstands the situation.

Anledningen till att Johnson inte håller med om detta är att han helt enkelt inte ser vad Kina skulle kunna göra för att “straffa” USA. Om de dumpar dollar, eller kraftigt reducerar sitt innehav av amerikanska statsskuldsväxlar, skulle det endast få som resultat att kinesiska exportvaror blir dyrare. Vilket alltså istället skulle gynna USA. Samtidigt säger han

It is in the interests of both the United States and global economic prosperity that China discontinues its massive intervention in the market for renminbi.

En annan smart kille, Robert Solomon, vid Stern School i NY kommenterar på följande vis vad ett avbrytande av den kinesiska intervetionen skulle innebära

Think about the short-term shock to the Chinese economy, which depends upon exports for a good portion of its GDP. By many accounts, exports make up some 25% of Chinese GDP. A revaluation of the yuan makes Chinese exports relatively more expensive thereby decreasing foreign demand for Chinese-made goods. This negatively impacts local production and creates a feedback loop through to domestic employment and wages. In the extreme, this threatens social stability, and China is certainly not the poster-child for social stability.

Not only that, but given the foreign interests and investments in China, it is not entirely clear to me that a yuan revaluation that catapults China into recession would not result in a global contagion effect. Supply chains are so interconnected around the globe that an upward price movement for intermediate and finished goods coming out of China could have dire consequences for Western companies that rely on Chinese-sourced goods (just ask Wal*Mart).

So although I agree in principle with Simon’s points, the Chinese government (and by extension, the global economy) finds itself between a rock and a hard place when it comes to the revaluation of the yuan. A sudden revaluation to competitive levels could come with socially and economically undesirable near-term adjustments. I therefore think it’s best we proceed with caution…

Rätt krångligt som sagt. Min enda slutsats är att det kommer bli turbulent framöver. USA och Kina börjar bli allt mer jämlika i sin internationella makt, vilket garanterat kommer leda till mycket stora spänningar. Sovjet är ersatt, det endast vi kan hoppas på nu är att det inte uppstår ett nytt kallt krig. Rent empiriskt borde det uppstå en världskonflikt ganska snart. Låt oss hålla tummarna att det inte blir så.

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